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    <title>topic Cyber security of EE Smart Router in Broadband &amp; Landline</title>
    <link>https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/Broadband-Landline/Cyber-security-of-EE-Smart-Router/m-p/1157084#M76295</link>
    <description>&lt;P&gt;Just wondering if EE have applied the recommendations from the NCSC dated 16 April 2018, to avoid the potential vulnerability exploits of the routers by Russian state actors?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;ISPs&lt;BR /&gt;• Do not field equipment in the network core or to customer premises with&lt;BR /&gt;legacy, unencrypted, or unauthenticated protocols and services. When&lt;BR /&gt;purchasing equipment from vendors, include this requirement in purchase&lt;BR /&gt;agreements.&lt;BR /&gt;• Disable legacy, unencrypted, or unauthenticated protocols and services. Use&lt;BR /&gt;modern encrypted management protocols such as SSH. Harden the&lt;BR /&gt;encrypted protocols based on current best security practices from the vendor.&lt;BR /&gt;• Initiate a plan to upgrade fielded equipment no longer supported by the&lt;BR /&gt;vendor with software updates and security patches. The best practice is to&lt;BR /&gt;field only supported equipment and replace legacy equipment prior to it falling&lt;BR /&gt;into an unsupported state.&lt;BR /&gt;• Apply software updates and security patches to fielded equipment. When that&lt;BR /&gt;is not possible, notify customers about software updates and security patches&lt;BR /&gt;and provide timely instructions on how to apply them.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-state-sponsored-cyber-actors-targeting-network-infrastructure-devices" target="_blank"&gt;https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-state-sponsored-cyber-actors-targeting-network-infrastructure-devices&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
    <pubDate>Wed, 03 Aug 2022 18:58:14 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>richardcw</dc:creator>
    <dc:date>2022-08-03T18:58:14Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Cyber security of EE Smart Router</title>
      <link>https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/Broadband-Landline/Cyber-security-of-EE-Smart-Router/m-p/1157084#M76295</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Just wondering if EE have applied the recommendations from the NCSC dated 16 April 2018, to avoid the potential vulnerability exploits of the routers by Russian state actors?&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;ISPs&lt;BR /&gt;• Do not field equipment in the network core or to customer premises with&lt;BR /&gt;legacy, unencrypted, or unauthenticated protocols and services. When&lt;BR /&gt;purchasing equipment from vendors, include this requirement in purchase&lt;BR /&gt;agreements.&lt;BR /&gt;• Disable legacy, unencrypted, or unauthenticated protocols and services. Use&lt;BR /&gt;modern encrypted management protocols such as SSH. Harden the&lt;BR /&gt;encrypted protocols based on current best security practices from the vendor.&lt;BR /&gt;• Initiate a plan to upgrade fielded equipment no longer supported by the&lt;BR /&gt;vendor with software updates and security patches. The best practice is to&lt;BR /&gt;field only supported equipment and replace legacy equipment prior to it falling&lt;BR /&gt;into an unsupported state.&lt;BR /&gt;• Apply software updates and security patches to fielded equipment. When that&lt;BR /&gt;is not possible, notify customers about software updates and security patches&lt;BR /&gt;and provide timely instructions on how to apply them.&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;&lt;P&gt;&lt;A href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-state-sponsored-cyber-actors-targeting-network-infrastructure-devices" target="_blank"&gt;https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/russian-state-sponsored-cyber-actors-targeting-network-infrastructure-devices&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 03 Aug 2022 18:58:14 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/Broadband-Landline/Cyber-security-of-EE-Smart-Router/m-p/1157084#M76295</guid>
      <dc:creator>richardcw</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2022-08-03T18:58:14Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Re: Cyber security of EE Smart Router</title>
      <link>https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/Broadband-Landline/Cyber-security-of-EE-Smart-Router/m-p/1158275#M76454</link>
      <description>&lt;P&gt;Hi &lt;a href="https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/user/viewprofilepage/user-id/959025"&gt;@richardcw&lt;/a&gt;,&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;Welcome to the EE Community. &lt;span class="lia-unicode-emoji" title=":slightly_smiling_face:"&gt;🙂&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;All our routers are regularly security tested and updated. We follow industry best practice and ensure security vulnerabilities such as those referenced are addressed.&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;&amp;nbsp;&lt;/P&gt;
&lt;P&gt;James&lt;/P&gt;</description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 09 Aug 2022 14:13:29 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid>https://community.ee.co.uk/t5/Broadband-Landline/Cyber-security-of-EE-Smart-Router/m-p/1158275#M76454</guid>
      <dc:creator>James_B</dc:creator>
      <dc:date>2022-08-09T14:13:29Z</dc:date>
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